Rewrite of Economist OP-ED: 'North Korea: Test its intentions'

This is a paragraph by paragraph rewrite and summary of a June 10th, 2005 Economist OP-ED and does not express my opinion on the subject matter therein. The intent is simply to make a legal version of expensive premium content available to public eyes without breaking copyright law. The original article may be found here at: North Korea: Test its intentions.

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Original Section Title: North Korea: Test its intentions

Original SubTitle: The diplomats need to get a better act together

Diplomats must hope for the best while expecting the worst. But, when dealing with North Korea's nuclear gamesmanship, expectations were highest five years ago this month when the president of South Korea had met with the President of North Korea for the first summit after 50 years. Unfortunately, once the North Korean president, Kim Jong Il, accepted the offered aid and other inducements that solidified the treaty between the divided peninsula, cold-war like hostilities resumed. Except at those times the North needed another buyout once again. The other North Korean anniversary this month is nothing to commemorate as well: it has been a full year since the North engaged in talks with America, South Korea, Japan, China and Russia to contain the North's nuclear aspirations. The North's unwillingness to continue with these talks has nearly drained the multilateral effort of any meaning.

The North's suggestion - but no promise - that it may continue forth with talks in the near future might not matter anyway. The rationale behind the diplomacy was to convince Mr. Kim to dismantle whatever nuclear weapons he may have and to terminate the program to prevent any more from ever being made. Yet he shows no desire to do so. In fact, those who claim that the North might be convinced to cede it's nuclear ambitions for a fee need only ask themselves why before the North kept everything offered to it and still reneged on every nuclear agreement they signed.

Original Text: North Korea's hint (not yet a promise) this week that it may return to the table soon may not change much. The purpose of the talks was to encourage Mr Kim to give up the nuclear weapons and means for making more that he claims to have. He has shown no such purpose. Indeed, those who argue that North Korea could be talked politely out of its nuclear efforts if only the price was right have to ask themselves why in the past it has pocketed all bribes and still cheated on every nuclear agreement it has ever signed.

In the set of talks up till last june the North had simply refused to disarm. Further, they threatened to test a weapon and sell their newfound nuclear skills and materials to whomever might bid. Instead of agreeing to shut down their bomb-making facilities, they demanded "rewards" for ending an illegitimate plutonium manufacture that they began two years prior to the United States' accusation that the North had long been following a second path to bomb-making through uranium enrichment. In addition to the production of plutonium, the North kicked out UN nuclear inspectors, ended its participation in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, pronounced itself a nuclear state, and, the United States claims, now appears ready to test a bomb.

The Multilateral talks were supposed to prevent this outcome. Everyone else but the North had officially agreed that North Korea should not build even one nuclear weapon, while unofficially ignoring the mounting evidence to the contrary. A nuclear test could set off the potential for a dangerous regional arms race, with Japan, South Korea and Taiwan soon following the North into the Nuclear fold. Yet all the North's neighbors would be willing to offer aid if only the North would drop their nuclear ambitions, helping them rebuild an economy in tatters.

Original Title: Back to the table isn't enough

The United States had hoped the five nations working together might prevent the North from splitting each other up through politicking, as they had been known to previously do. Organized effort from all was hoped to provide the leverage needed to convince the North to give up its bomb-making. It may still happen. But Mr Kim's unwillingness to continue further diplomacy suggests that the organized multilateral front may, in fact, be working. Unfortunately, the long wait in restarting diplomacy doesn't help the potential for renewed negotiations between all member states, should the North be willing to show once again.

Everyone is in agreement: North Korea should not become a nuclear state. Unfortunately, each member state in the multilateral talks considers the risks of the outcome from a different perspective. China is concerned with the potential for chaos and refugees crossing the border should the North Korean government collapse. It gives the North the majority of their food and energy. They could easily grasp the North's attention by refusing further energy trade, but refuses. And China prevents discussion of North Korea's infractions at the UN Security Council.

South Korea, like China, continues to increase their business with the North. While they still withhold a huge aid package until the North finally disarms, they continue to invest just enough to keep the North's regime alive while keeping quiet about more than just the North's nuclear gamesmanship: the kidnapping of thousands of South Korean citizens over many years; the terrible treatment political prisoners receive; etc. To remain quiet over such matters can only encourage the North to continue on as if they could do anything without penalty.

Original Text: Like China, South Korea has increasing business with North Korea. It is withholding massive aid until North Korea agrees to disarm, yet drip-feeds Mr Kim enough to help his regime survive—while keeping mum about not just its nuclear antics, but also the kidnapping over the years of thousands of South Korean citizens, the appalling treatment of political prisoners and the like. That silence only emboldens Mr Kim to think he can get away with anything.

The United States is more open about discussing the North's past horrible behavior. And it is also less patient than the other multilateral partners to openly discuss the North's breaking of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty with the UN Security Council. But the Bush administration's own internal disputes over the matter prevent an unambiguous front necessary if the North is to be pressured into a deal. Some within the Bush Administration insist the United States will negotiate in good faith, while other refuse outright to partner with evil. Which, the others partners ask, is the official policy?

It's possible the skeptics are right. North Korea may never give up its nuclear weapons program. But the diplomats could still do a better job of trying to change Mr. Kim's mind.

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© 2005, J. Maynard Gelinas. Some Rights Reserved This work is available with a Creative Commons license. Noncommercial duplication permitted with full attribution and without modification of the text.